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THE PURPOSE OF THE MNB'S RESERVE 
REQUIREMENT SYSTEM IS TO SUPPORT 
THE LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT OF 
CREDIT INSTITUTIONS AND NARROW 
THE GAP BETWEEN INTERBANK RATES 
AND THE CENTRAL BANK BASE RATE
Due to their considerable differences, reserve requirement 
systems should always be assessed individually, taking into 
consideration their most important parameters and the role 
of the reserve requirement in the given central bank's 
m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s .  A t  p r e s e n t ,  t h e  r e s e r v e  
requirement is one of the most misinterpreted instruments 
of a central bank, and one frequently encounters 
misunderstandings about its role. This is true notwithstanding 
that in the modern practice of international central banks 
– regardless of how diverse the parameters of the reserve 
system may be – there has been a certain consensus for quite 
some time regarding the potential roles which reserve 
requirements can play in today's monetary policy schemes.
In Hungary, all credit institutions and branches of foreign 
credit institutions are subject to reserve requirements. This 
means that each credit institution is required to deposit a 
certain forint amount on its account held with Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank (MNB). This amount is referred to as the 
reserve requirement; its volume is the product of the reserve 
ratio and the reserve base of the credit institution concerned. 
The reserve base is defined as the total of certain liability 
categories (typically liabilities with maturities less than 2 
years) in the credit institutions' end-of-month balance sheet, 
while the reserve ratio stipulates the percentage of this 
Lóránt Varga: Introducing optional reserve ratios 
in Hungary*
As of the reserve maintenance period commencing in November 2010, Hungarian credit institutions will be free to decide 
whether to apply the previously valid 2% reserve ratio, or to apply a higher mandatory reserve ratio. Credit institutions 
required to hold reserves may select from reserve ratios of 2, 3, 4 and 5%, and may change their decision on a semi-annual 
basis.
In line with the international best practice, the purpose of the MNB’s reserve requirement system is to support credit 
institutions' liquidity management by the monthly averaging mechanism and to thereby contribute to narrowing the gap 
between short-term interbank rates and the central bank base rate. Indeed, with the intra-day and inter-day fluctuation of 
amounts held on their accounts with MNB as required reserves, credit institutions are able to manage, to a certain degree, 
unexpected short-term liquidity impacts they may be exposed to. Thus, banks are less dependent on overnight central bank 
deposits and loans, which, however suitable for managing unexpected liquidity impacts, are known to divert interbank rates 
from the central bank base rate.
It should be emphasised that in modern central banking practice – when the economy is influenced through determining the 
central bank base rate rather than money supply – changing the reserve ratio does not impact the direction of monetary policy. 
That is, the raising or lowering of the reserve ratio does not generate any monetary tightening or easing within the operating 
frameworks of most of today's central banks. Accordingly, the sole purpose of the MNB’s latest measure is to facilitate 
liquidity management for the banking system, and it is not intended to influence aggregate demand and inflation via credit 
supply.
Based on recent experience, credit institutions differ significantly from one another regarding the reserve ratio which is 
optimal for managing their own liquidity. While the 5% reserve ratio which was in effect until November 2008 was too high 
for some credit institutions, the current 2% ratio is too low for banks with relatively high payment turnover. Therefore, by 
introducing optional higher reserve ratios, the MNB seeks to ensure that in the future the reserve requirement system will 
support the liquidity management of all domestic credit institutions with appropriate efficiency, while also contributing, to 
the largest possible extent, to the narrowing of the gap between interbank rates and the central bank base rate.
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the offical view ot the Magyar Nemzeti Bank.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
MNB BULLETIN • OCTOBER 2010 58
amount to be deposited with MNB as reserves. A new 
reserve requirement is calculated for all credit institutions in 
each month. As the calculated amount must be maintained 
for the entire calendar month, calendar months are also 
known as ‘reserve maintenance periods’ for the purposes of 
reserve requirements.
The averaging mechanism is the most important feature of 
the MNB’s reserve requirement system. This means that 
credit institutions are not required to deposit their total 
reserve amount on their MNB account every day. Instead, 
they must manage their funds held with the MNB so that 
the average of end-of-day balances for every calendar month 
fulfils their reserve requirement prescribed for the specific 
month. The way averaging works in practice – based on the 
June, July and August 2010 reserve maintenance periods – is 
illustrated by Chart 1.
After the end of each month, the MNB verifies whether a 
credit institution’s average closing account balances for the 
month concerned met the respective reserve requirement, 
and pays market interest on the deposited reserves. Thus, if 
a credit institution's average account balance for a certain 
month fulfils the reserve requirement prescribed for the 
credit institution, the MNB pays the central bank base rate 
on the required reserve amount. It should be noted though 
that additional account balances – i.e. excess reserves – do 
not earn any interest.
On the other hand, if the credit institution’s average account 
balance for the month concerned falls short of the required 
reserve amount, the MNB pays the central bank base rate 
only for that lower amount – i.e. the part of the reserve 
requirement that was met – while also charging the credit 
institution a penalty, the amount of which is calculated as 
the product of the penalty interest, which corresponds to 
the central bank base rate, and the shortfall amount. Thus, 
the MNB sanctions both under- and over-reserving to the 
same extent: in the case of over-reserving by interest 
withheld, and in the case of under-reserving by penalty 
interest, both equalling the central bank base rate.
In summary, based on its main features, the MNB’s reserve 
requirement system uses an averaging mechanism, pays 
market interest and equally sanctions both under- and over-
reserving. Rather than having developed by coincidence, 
these features are closely connected to the objective the 
MNB seeks to achieve through the operation of the reserve 
requirement system.
The sole purpose of the MNB's reserve requirement 
regulation is to support credit institutions in managing 
liquidity by the monthly averaging mechanism and to help 
mitigate the fluctuation of interbank rates and their 
permanent deviation from the central bank base rate. With 
the MNB paying central bank base rate on required reserves 
but nothing on additional funds, banks generally maintain 
exactly the same average monthly balance as their specified 
reserve requirement, as seen on Chart 1.
If, on a given day, a credit institution faces an unexpected 
demand for liquidity because, for example, one of its major 
clients submits a payment order for a significant amount, it 
has several options for managing the situation. It may raise 
the required funds from the interbank market, i.e. by taking 
a short-term loan from another bank. It may also take a 
central bank overnight loan, but this is expensive: the 
MNB's ov ernight credit instrument bears an interest rate 
that is 1 percentage point higher than the central bank base 
rate. Finally – thanks to reserve requirement averaging – it 
may also opt to reduce its account balance below the reserve 
requirement, to be offset by maintaining a higher balance 
throughout the remaining part of the reserve period.
Accordingly, the averaging mechanism functions as an 
additional tool for banks to manage liquidity shocks they 
may face. If there were no averaging mechanism, the 
account balance of the banks would have to meet the reserve 
requirement at the end of each day, while an overly tight 
scope of action for averaging the reserve account would 
only be suitable for tackling smaller liquidity shocks.
In the case of large-scale shocks impacting the entire 
banking system, there would be a considerable excess 
demand or oversupply in the interbank market, and credit 
institutions would be forced to resort to overnight central 
Chart 1
The reserve requirement system’s monthly 
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b a n k  l o a n s  o r  d e p o s i t s  m u c h  m o r e  o f t e n . 1 This would 
temporarily divert interbank interest rates from the central 
bank rate to a considerable extent, as the interbank price of 
liquidity would then be determined by the actual interest 
rate on the overnight central bank instrument taken, and 
the interest of the overnight deposit and overnight loan is 1 
percentage point lower and higher, respectively, than the 
central bank base rate.
Moreover, to ensure their liquidity management, over the 
long run banks would likely adjust to the absence of 
averaging or a tight scope of action by creating a permanent 
overnight central bank deposit portfolio. This is because the 
liquidity of the overnight central bank deposit is extremely 
high, as it expires every day, and thus it is suitable for 
managing banks' unexpected liquidity demands. As a result 
of this the interbank interest rate could be permanently and 
considerably, by up to 1 percentage point, lower than the 
central bank base rate, which may reduce the efficiency of 
the monetary transmission.
Thus, the reserve requirement system, with an appropriate 
averaging mechanism, is one of the most important tools for 
smoothing interbank rates and mitigating their deviation 
from the central bank base rate. As described later, the 
optional higher reserve ratios have been introduced precisely 
because the prevailing 2% ratio was no longer sufficient to 
provide some Hungarian banks with a broad enough scope 
for averaging.
THE SIZE OF RESERVE REQUIREMENTS 
IMPACTS NEITHER THE MONETARY 
POLICY STANCE, NOR THE LENDING 
CAPACITY OF BANKS
Many readers might find it odd that the purpose of reserve 
requirements is to support the liquidity management of 
credit institutions and narrow the gap between the interbank 
rates and the central bank base rate. This is because in 
textbooks and articles on monetary policy the reserve ratio 
and reserve requirements are often described as tools to 
influence the credit supply of commercial banks, which – 
through the money multiplier – is also suitable for controlling 
the broader money supplies in the economy.
These interpretations state that higher reserve ratios reduce 
the potential credit supply of banks, which results in a 
decrease in the money supply in the economy, i.e. a stricter 
monetary policy. On the other hand, a lower reserve ratio 
represents a looser monetary policy as it increases the 
lending capacity of banks, thereby swelling the money 
supply in the economy. However, these correlations are no 
longer valid in the majority of today's monetary policy 
systems.
1  Liquidity shocks impacting the entire banking system are events generating such unexpected liquidity demand or liquidity surplus in central bank funds, which result 
in the change of the entire banking system's liquidity, rather than the mere reallocation of funds between banks’ accounts. These are usually connected to payments 
between the banking system and the government, or the banking system and central bank. Typical liquidity shocks impacting the entire banking system include the 
difficult–to-forecast tax payments of corporate customers (e.g. VAT payments) or unexpected, large payments from the treasury account of the government held with 
MNB.
2   As it has no impact on our conclusions, we refrained from providing the full details of the model, thus – amongst others – we do not touch upon the fact that the 
economic agents may also keep cash. The money multiplier-based model of money supply is described in detail by, for example, Mankiw (1997), McCallum (1989).
Simply put, the classic money multiplier model states that a 
commercial bank can make available only a certain part of its deposits 
as loans, as it has to deposit the rest with the central bank as required 
reserves. If, for example, a commercial bank originally has 1,000 units 
of money on its account held with the central bank and the reserve 
ratio is 10%, then of the 1,000 units it can lend out a maximum of 900 
units as loans, while it keeps 100 units (the product of the 1,000 units 
of funds and the 10% reserve ratio) as required reserves on its central 
bank account. Assuming that the 900 units lent out as loans ends up 
with another commercial bank as a deposit, then of these 900 units 
the second bank can only lend out 810 units as loans, while keeping 
90 units on its central bank account as required reserve, and so on 
(Chart 2).
If this deposit placement and lending process expands, then the loans 
granted by the commercial banks, i.e. total amount of commercial bank 
money will be
1000 × [(1-r) + (1-r)2 + (1-r)3 + (1-r)4 + …] = 1000 × (1/r)
in the economy, which translates, using the 10% reserve ratio of our 
example, into 1,000×(1/0.1) = 10,000 units.2 The above formula illustrates 
the reason why the reserve requirement plays a key role in this model. If 
the reserve ratio, i.e. r in the formula increases, commercial banks can lend 
less, thus they can create less commercial bank money. On the other 
hand, decreasing the reserve ratio will increase the banks' lending 
capacity and the volume of commercial bank money in the economy.
Box 1: How does the reserve ratio work as a monetary policy instrument in the money multiplier model 
of textbooks?MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Even in theory, the textbook model of the money multiplier 
could work in a banking system where only a predetermined 
volume of central bank money is available for commercial 
banks (Box 1). The assumption of money supply controlled 
by the central bank instead of determined on the basis of the 
commercial banks' demand for central bank liquidity was 
mostly satisfied by monetary policy systems that targeted 
monetary aggregates, followed by the central banks of some 
developed countries in 1970s and 1980s. The central 
element of these systems was that, by using the correlations 
of the money multiplier, they sought to have a direct 
influence on the money supply that determines inflation 
trends in the long run. In line with this they tried to achieve 
– by adjusting either the central bank money supply or the 
reserve ratio, or both – that the broader volume of money in 
the economy reaches the volume and the rate of growth 
deemed necessary for the proper development of inflation.
Thus, in theory, the money multiplier may have worked in 
these systems, but the monetary policies that targeted 
monetary aggregates have not proven successful. It is not the 
intention of this article to evaluate the various monetary 
policy systems, but in summary we may state that the largest 
problem was that the money multiplier model defines only 
the theoretical maximum of the commercial banks' lending 
capacity, but there is no guarantee that the banks would use 
it for lending under any circumstances. In addition, the 
broader money supplies often follow the changes of the 
central bank money supply or the reserve ratio only with 
uncertainty or significant delay, and therefore it is not easy 
to react properly with these instruments to changes of the 
economic environment and it is difficult to determine the 
parameters responsible for the long-term development of 
inflation.3 Today, there is hardly any central bank that 
would try to exert direct and exclusive influence on the 
development of money supply.
Today’s central banks in most developed and emerging 
countries use some form of inflation targeting, which means 
directly influencing the economy's interest rate level in a 
way that the expected price level trends correspond to the 
inflation target. Since this monetary policy does not wish to 
assert direct impact on the broader money aggregates, it fits 
in with such monetary policy instruments that adjust the 
central bank money supply to the demands of commercial 
banks, which in this way – under the applicable central bank 
interest – is practically unlimited.4
This means that credit institutions may take unlimited 
central bank liquidity from the central bank at or close to 
the central bank base rate against collateral, or deposit 
unlimited central bank funds with the central bank, in 
accordance with their needs. And funds originating from 
the central bank are typically not subject to the reserve 
requirement, i.e. there is no need to place required reserves 
for them.
The MNB implements an inflation targeting monetary 
policy relying on monetary policy instruments influencing 
the interest rate level of the various financial markets. 
Considering the entire banking system, the amount of 
central bank money available for Hungarian banks 
considerably exceeds their relevant demand,5 and therefore, 
as  part  o f  the  MNB ’ s  monetary  po licy  instruments,  they  
may – subject to their own decision – deposit unlimited 
amounts of liquidity with the central bank in the form of 
It is important to see that the money multiplier is built on the basic 
assumption that the volume of central bank money available at any 
time for the banking system is a fixed amount determined by the 
central bank in advance – in our example 1,000 units – that is 
multiplied through the commercial banks’ lending activity into a 
larger volume of commercial bank money defined by the reserve ratio, 
in our example into 10,000 units. This assumption is not valid in the 
case of today’s monetary policy systems and instruments, thus the 
money multiplier model presented above cannot work in the 
described form either.
Chart 2
The money multiplier in principle
Central bank money supply = 1000
Reserve ratio (r) = 10%
100 reserves 
at central bank
1000 depostis 90 reserves 
at central bank
900 depostis 81 reserves 
at central bank
810 depostis
900 loans 810 loans 729 loans
Lending potential: Lending potential: Lending potential:
1000×(1-r) [1000*(1-r)]×(1-r) = 1000×(1-r) [1000*(1-r)2]×(1-r) = 1000×(1-r)3
Bank No.1 Bank No.2 Bank No.3
3   For details on the monetary policy role of the various monetary aggregates see Komáromi (2008).
4   This is true even when certain developed central banks issue central bank money through volume tenders, just like e.g. ECB before the crisis. In this latter case the 
central bank money supply is not unlimited in the true sense of the word, but even then the case is not that the central bank wants to influence the volume of central 
bank money available for banks to draw down, but rather that it is capable of determining very accurately – relying on its developed forecasting tools – the banks' 
demand for central bank money at systemic level. If this demand increases, e.g. because banks lend more than previously at systemic level, central banks automatically 
increase the volume of central bank money offered in the tender.
5   This condition is referred to as systemic liquidity surplus and it characterises the majority of the countries in the world.MNB BULLETIN • OCTOBER 2010 61
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two-week MNB-bills. Thus, domestic banks are able to 
manage the liquidity demand or liquidity surplus arising as 
a result of the minimum reserve requirement increase or 
decrease by reducing or increasing their two-week MNB-
bill portfolio. Meanwhile, credit institutions are also 
protected from interest loss, as the MNB pays central bank 
base rate both on the banks' required reserves and on the 
liquidity deposited in two-week MNB-bills.
This also means that credit institutions do not necessarily 
want to have lower reserve ratio; on the contrary – taking 
into account that the primary function of the reserve 
requirement is its role as a liquidity buffer – a very low 
reserve ratio is by no means favourable for banks. Exceptions 
from this are reserve requirement systems that remunerate 
reserves at below-the-market interest rates, because due to 
the income curtailment realised through them, banks are 
In the practice of today’s central banks – where central bank money 
supply priced at the central bank base rate is practically unlimited for 
commercial banks – the lending of Bank No.1 mentioned in Box 1 can 
no longer be restricted by the reserve ratio. If the bank wishes to lend 
1,000 units rather than 900, it can obtain the remaining 100 units from 
the central bank. As loans from the central bank are not subject to the 
reserve requirement, the bank will be under no obligation to increase its 
already allocated required reserves and can therefore use all the 100 
units of central bank funds for lending. This also illustrates the main 
difference relative to the basic assumption of the money multiplier 
model: the central bank money supply is not an externally determined 
(not exogenous) factor for commercial banks, as the central bank loan 
obtained by Bank No.1 increased the total central bank money supply 
by 100 units.
Thus, the reserve ratio and the reserve requirement calculated with the 
help of the former have no impact on the domestic banks' lending 
activity, the development of broader money supplies or the direction of 
the monetary policy. The same applies to modern international practice 
as well, since the primary purpose of reserve requirement systems – 
utilised by central banks operating with an essentially unlimited supply 
of central bank money, as is the case in Hungary – is to support the 
liquidity management of commercial banks and reduce the gap 
between interbank rates and the central bank base rate.
In November 2008, the MNB reduced the reserve ratio of Hungarian 
credit institutions from 5% to 2%. The reasons and consequences of this 
will be described in detail in the next chapter; however, this event 
provides a good opportunity to present – after the theoretical deduction 
on real figures as well – the operation of the money multiplier model in 
the practice of current monetary policy systems. 
Chart 3 clearly illustrates that, according to the money multiplier model, 
the volume of commercial bank money, i.e. the sum of all commercial 
bank deposits, should have significantly exceeded the observed figures 
already before November 2008, fluctuating somewhere around HUF 
30,000-35,000 billion. Afterwards, following the reduction of the reserve 
ratio in November 2008, based on the simple mathematical correlation 
presented in Box 1, the volume of commercial bank money should have 
achieved a sudden increase of 5/2 times or 250 percent, to around HUF 
150,000 billion. 
However, this obviously did not occur in the longer run either, since – as 
already presented in theory – the reserve ratio has no impact on the 
lending and money creation capacity of commercial banks. In reality, 
the sum of commercial bank funds increased from HUF 10,000 billion to 
HUF 13,000 billion between 2007 and 2010 along a gradual and even 
trend, and lowering of the reserve ratio in November 2008 caused no 
break whatsoever in its development.
Box 2: Why does the reserve ratio have no impact on monetary aggregates in modern central banking 
practice?
6   Similarly to the theoretical deduction, in the case of these calculations as well, we ignored cash balances, but it has no impact on our conclusions here either.
Source: MNB.
Chart 3
Trends in credit institutions’ deposits according 
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Central bank money (banks’ account balances+overnight 
deposits+amount of liquidity absorbing instrument)
Credit institutions’ deposits in fact
Credit institutions’ deposits according to the money 
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interested in the lowest possible reserve ratio even if this 
restricts the liquidity buffer function.
Reserve systems paying below-the-market or zero interest 
are still rather frequent these days. Up until May 2004, the 
interest the MNB paid on required reserves was slightly 
lower than the central bank base rate, but then – as 
mentioned above – it transformed its reserve requirement 
system to pay market interest, thereby putting an end to the 
former practice of income curtailment.
LOWERING THE RESERVE RATIO IN 
NOVEMBER 2008 WAS PART OF CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT…
From 2002 until November 2008, the MNB applied a 5% 
reserve ratio, i.e. credit institutions were required to deposit 
5% of their reserve funds with the central bank as required 
reserves. While the definition of reserve funds was already 
fully identical with the calculation applied by the European 
Central Bank (ECB) for eurozone banks, the 5% domestic 
reserve ratio in this period considerably exceeded ECB’s 2% 
reserve ratio.
The difference between Hungarian and eurozone reserve 
ratios was attributable to the fact that, at the aggregate level, 
the Hungarian banking system was hit by unexpected 
liquidity shocks which were proportionately larger than 
those affecting the Eurozone’s banking system. Due to this 
– in accordance with the findings of previous chapters – a 
higher reserve ratio was optimal for the domestic banking 
system in terms of liquidity management, as the liquidity 
demands of individual banks – and thereby the 
proportionately more significant fluctuation of the daily 
closing balance of their central bank account – could be 
managed more easily with an averaging mechanism that 
calls for a higher reserve requirement. From mid-2004 
onwards, it has been especially true that the higher reserve 
ratio is ideal for Hungarian banks, when by terminating the 
interest curtailment via the reserve requirement, the higher 
ratio practically did not have any disadvantage any longer.
However, on an individual basis domestic banks can 
basically be allocated into two groups regarding their 
adequate volume of reserve requirement relative to their 
liabilities subject to minimum reserve requirements, i.e. the 
optimal reserve ratio. Under normal market circumstances 
banks with higher balance sheet totals, and thereby higher 
reserve base, exposed to smaller fluctuations in liquidity 
requirements, face no problems in managing their cash flow 
even with a lower reserve ratio.
As opposed to this, the higher reserve ratio is optimal for 
banks having clients generating large payment turnover, but 
– relative to the resulting fluctuation of the central bank 
account's closing balance – a low balance sheet total, as this 
way they can maintain an average balance on reserves that 
is sufficiently high for managing the large liquidity shocks 
to which they are exposed. Naturally, no sharp division line 
exists between these two groups, and it also may happen 
that a bank in certain periods belongs to one of the groups, 
and then at another time to the other group.
Additionally, we can also interpret the MNB's liquidity 
m a n a g e m e n t  s y s t e m  a s  a l l o w i n g  H u n g a r i a n  c r e d i t  
institutions to tie up their central bank liquidity in two 
instruments, both of which pay central bank base rate: 
required reserves and two-week MNB-bills. These two 
instruments, however, have significantly different liquidity 
profiles. Due to averaging, required reserves are extremely 
liquid over a few days' horizon, as by varying the central 
bank account balance they can be practically used freely for 
managing liquidity shocks at that timescale. However, for 
longer periods of several weeks, these assets become much 
less liquid, for they must be maintained on a permanent 
basis and, regarding individual monthly averages, banks are 
required to meet their respective reserve requirements. The 
situation is exactly the opposite in the case of the two-week 
MNB-bill, as the liquidity it represents will not be available 
for two weeks. Over the long term, however, it can be freely 
utilised as it is not an obligation – only an opportunity – for 
banks to renew their maturing portfolios or certain parts 
thereof.
It follows from all this that under normal market 
circumstances – when the trend of central bank liquidity for 
the entire system is quantifiable for the longer run and 
banks generally face short-term unexpected liquidity shocks 
of varying directions – banks tend to prefer a sufficiently 
high reserve requirement due to its short-term liquidity 
buffer role. Nevertheless, as described above, these 
sufficiently high reserve ratios may differ significantly high 
for banks with different payment turnover profiles. This 
article has so far dealt mainly with this situation with 
regards to the role of the reserve requirement system.
In November 2008, however, an entirely different situation 
emerged due to the global crisis which affected the domestic 
financial markets as well. At that time, several banks were 
hit by large-scale, lasting and unidirectional liquidity-
absorbing shocks due to the drastic fall in the liquidity of 
the forint interbank market and their foreign exchange swap 
exposures, as a result of which they were faced by a deficit 
in forint liquidity. At that time, the high required reserve – 
less liquid in the longer run – was already not advantageous 
for these banks. Moreover, the majority of these banks were MNB BULLETIN • OCTOBER 2010 63
among those able to handle the fluctuation of their central 
bank account balance easily even under lower reserve 
requirements. Thus, due to the freezing up of the forint 
interbank market – i.e. the shortage of loans available from 
other banks – which occurred at the same time, the 
considerable forint funds tied up as required reserves owing 
to the relatively high 5% reserve ratio, already represented 
a factor hindering liquidity management for these banks 
with a forint liquidity deficit.
T a k i n g  t h i s  i n t o  a c c o u n t ,  i n  N o v e m b e r  2 0 0 8  t h e  M N B  
lowered the reserve ratio in a single step to 2%, the ratio 
that is also applied in the euro area. The reduction of the 
reserve ratio (together with the other central bank measures 
introduced then, e.g. the significant expansion of the range 
and volume of eligible collaterals, the narrowing of the 
interest corridor and the central bank instruments of 
various tenors providing foreign exchange liquidity) was 
able to increase the freely utilisable forint liquidity of the 
aforementioned credit institutions, thereby mitigating the 
liquidity stresses on the individual banks and the forint 
interbank market.
It should be pointed out, though, that the factors hindering 
the reduction of the reserve ratio at an earlier time (i.e. 
frequent events generating relatively high unexpected 
liquidity deficit or liquidity surplus) were present in the 
autumn of 2008 as well, but – due to the longer-than-usual, 
unidirectional, liquidity-absorbing shock – these were 
superseded by the banks' requirement to obtain sufficient 
v o l um e  o f  f o rin t  li q ui di ty .  Th us,  l o w e rin g  o f  th e  r es e rv e  
ratio in November 2008 was a measure suitable for 
remedying an important problem and could be executed 
quickly under the extraordinary circumstances. It still holds 
true though that with the lower reserve requirement, credit 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  a b l e  t o  m a n a g e  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  s y s t e m - w i d e  
liquidity shocks only by tighter liquidity management and 
possibly more frequent utilisation of the central bank 
overnight standing facilities (overnight deposit and loan).
This is because as a result of reducing the reserve ratio from 
5% to 2%, the reserve requirements of all domestic banks 
fell by 60 percent (from HUF 770 billion to HUF 320 billion 
at the aggregate level) as of the December 2008 reserve 
maintenance period. This was accompanied by the 
proportionate narrowing of the limits of the credit 
institutions' central bank account balance fluctuations, i.e. 
the scope for managing unexpected liquidity impacts 
decreased (Chart 4). The problem was exacerbated by the 
fact that due to the significant fall in interbank market 
liquidity, after the reduction of the reserve ratio banks could 
r e l y  o n  t h e  m a r k e t  t o  l e s s e r  e x t e n t  t h a n  b e f o r e ,  w h i c h  
generated further difficulties for banks with relatively high 
payment turnover, which had already pursued a relatively 
stressed liquidity management regime.
… BUT IT COULD GENERATE LIQUIDITY 
MANAGEMENT FRICTIONS OVER THE 
LONGER RUN
Thus, in theory the lower reserve ratio could have, in its 
own right, weakened the efficient operation of monetary 
policy instruments, as in the case of an illiquid forint 
interbank market it results in the more active utilisation of 
the central bank's overnight instruments and thereby lasting 
deviation of interbank forint interest rates from the central 
bank base rate. The decision as to whether – due to the 
relatively low reserve ratio – the overnight deposit or the 
loan instrument is used, primarily depends on the prudence 
level of banks' liquidity management. In the following 
section, we analyse to what extent the significantly increased 
utilisation of the central bank’s overnight instruments 
during the crisis period was attributable to the lower reserve 
ratio.
If all banks have considerable liquidity surplus, but their 
liquidity management behaviour is still characterised by 
enhanced, or even exaggerated, prudence, then they buy 
fewer 2-week MNB-bills than would be reasonable, and 
they place their freely utilisable liquidity – above the reserve 
requirement – in overnight deposits. This attitude is loss-
making for banks, since under the present width of the 
interest corridor the MNB pays by 1 percentage point lower 
interest on overnight deposits than on the 2-week MNB-
bill. Despite this, between November 2008 and November 
2009 – for an entire year – this was practically the standard 
behaviour in the Hungarian banking sector.
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Chart 4
Fluctuation of credit institutions’ account balances 
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For the period following the outbreak of the crisis and the 
drying up of the interbank money market there may be 
several explanations why banks followed this loss-making 
approach; one of these is supported precisely by the 
excessively low level of the reserve ratio. Namely, if a bank's 
funds allocated as reserve requirement are insufficient for 
neutralising unexpected liquidity impacts by the fluctuation 
of its current account balance (i.e. it is unable to reduce its 
account balance sufficiently below its reserve requirement, 
as the reserve requirement is already too low as well), it can 
remedy the situation by accumulating overnight deposits. 
The accumulated deposit portfolio in such cases works as a 
real liquidity buffer, as it expires daily and the bank in 
question can decide daily to decrease or increase it as a 
function of the actual liquidity demand or liquidity surplus. 
Thus, the overnight deposit portfolio supplements the 
reserve requirement account, thereby practically enabling 
the bank to increase the required reserves, set too low for it. 
Naturally, this is loss-making for the bank compared with 
the situation where the required reserve level – earning 
market interest – would be indeed higher.
However, in an uncertain liquidity and interbank market 
situation it is possible that banks would rather accept this 
loss in order to ensure calculable and comfortable liquidity 
management. Moreover, between October 2008 and 
November 2009 there was a narrower, +/-50-basis point 
interest corridor, which halved the potential loss of this 
liquidity management behaviour, thereby reducing banks’ 
incentives to liquidate their overnight deposit portfolio. The 
accumulation of the significant overnight deposit portfolio 
is unfavourable for the MNB as well, because then the 
interbank market is dominated by the overnight deposit 
interest, which is lower than the key policy rate, which 
could distort the interest transmission.
Since after the outbreak of the crisis and the drying of the 
interbank money market many different reasons could 
jointly lead to the significant increase of the overnight 
deposit portfolio,7 based on the experiences of the 2008-
2009 period it could not be decided beyond any doubt 
whether the 2% reserve ratio was indeed too low. In our 
s u r v e y  c o n d u c t e d  i n  a u t u m n  2 0 0 9  w e  c a m e  t o  t h e  
conclusion that during 2008-2009 the stagnation of the 
overnight deposit portfolio at a high level was not primarily 
due to the reduction of the reserve ratio, but rather to the 
change in banks' liquidity management preferences. The 
main reason for this could be the decrease in the interbank 
markets’ liquidity. On the other hand, due to the narrower 
interest corridor, the motivation to use the interbank 
market was indeed lower, which further reduced the 
liquidity thereof.
At the same time, it could also not be ruled out that the 
reduction of the reserve ratio did contribute to the sudden 
increase of the overnight deposit portfolio. According to 
our findings, the reduction of the reserve ratio in accordance 
with the theoretical considerations could cause the deliberate 
increase of the overnight deposit portfolio primarily in the 
case of those banks that could make use of the reserve 
system's averaging mechanism to a lesser extent than before 
(i.e. banks with relatively high payment turnover).
Following the reinstatement of the interest corridor to its 
previous width of ±100 basis points in November 2009, the 
overnight central bank deposit portfolio decreased 
considerably. This is because thereafter banks made greater 
efforts to ensure that the MNB-bill portfolio which they 
purchased approximated the optimal level in terms of 
liquidity management. As a result of this, interbank market 
turnover increased and the average value of the overnight 
interbank interest rate also came closer to the middle of the 
interest corridor. These changes resulted in a situation 
which provides an opportunity for a more in-depth 
evaluation of the reserve ratio level. This is because if banks 
purchase the volume of 2-week MNB-bills corresponding to 
the expected liquidity situation and do not keep overnight 
deposits, then they can manage unexpected liquidity 
impacts occurring between two MNB-bill auctions in two 
ways.
If the reserve ratio level is adequate, the credit institutions 
are practically able to fully manage a systemic unexpected 
liquidity absorbing shock by reducing their account balance, 
without the need to take overnight loans. However, if the 
reserve ratio level is too low for most of the banks, these 
banks will not be able to reduce their account balance by the 
appropriate extent, thus – in order to manage the systemic 
liquidity absorbing shock – temporarily (until the next 
2 - w e e k  M N B - b i l l  a u c t i o n )  t h e y  m a y  b e  f o r c e d  t o  t a k e  
overnight loans in the beginning of the reserve period, or 
even in the middle of it. Thus, from the amount of the net 
overnight loans taken during the unexpected banking 
system-level liquidity absorbing shocks that occurred since 
November 2009, we may make conclusions whether the low 
reserve ratio represents a problem.
Since last November there were two occasions when we 
experienced that – as a result of unexpected liquidity 
absorbing shocks – certain banks were forced to take large 
7   During the crisis other instruments introduced by MNB also contributed to the increase of liquidity surplus, and the payments made from the treasury account – 
fundamentally influencing the liquidity of the banking system – also increased the banking system's liquidity gradually.MNB BULLETIN • OCTOBER 2010 65
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overnight loans in the middle of the reserve period, despite 
the fact that at the systemic level the banks' central bank 
account balance decreased by an unprecedented extent 
(Chart 5). In mid-December 2009 for a few days the 
domestic credit institutions’ central bank account balance 
decreased to a level that was by HUF 100-180 billion lower 
than the prevailing HUF 340 billion required reserve 
amount of the individual banks. Despite this, on 15 
December over HUF 70 billion in net overnight central 
bank loans was drawn down. In mid-April 2010, banks’ 
central bank account balance lagged behind the HUF 350 
billion aggregate required reserves by HUF 150-200 billion, 
and then the domestic banks were forced to take large 
overnight central bank loans on five subsequent days, the 
net daily amount of which fluctuated around HUF 50 
billion.
In the two periods mentioned, typically those banks were 
forced to take overnight central bank loans that had to 
manage a significant payment turnover in these periods 
relative to the size of their reserve requirements. Several of 
these banks – despite their relatively low balance sheet total 
– are, under normal circumstances, considered as key 
players providing liquidity in several interbank markets. 
Comparing the average overnight loan amounts taken by 
them with the size of their reserve requirements we may 
state that in terms of liquidity management the previous, 
5% level of the reserve ratio is possibly closer to the optimal 
level for these banks, than the 2% ratio introduced in 
November 2008.
Based on the borrowing figures of the two periods in 2010, 
characterised by a stressed liquidity situation, the 2% value 
of the reserve ratio as a matter of fact limited the resistance 
of banks with relatively large payment turnover to 
unexpected liquidity absorbing impacts. The liquidity 
management frictions of these banks – due to their significant 
interbank market activity and the lower liquidity of the 
interbank market than before the crisis – have a systemic 
impact as well at the time of unexpected liquidity shocks, 
since the overnight interbank return – due to the banks' 
liquidity management limits – in such cases almost always 
swings up to the upper edge of the interest corridor. 
Interbank interest rates being permanently at the top of the 
interest corridor may distort the interest transmission in the 
same way as interest rates stuck at the bottom of the 
corridor. Even if the high interbank interest rate does not 
prove to be lasting, it may motivate banks to pursue the 
former, overly cautious liquidity management, i.e. to once 
again accumulate considerable overnight deposit portfolios, 
for which we saw several examples again in recent months. 
Thus, there is little chance that we shall have a stable 
interbank interest around the central bank base rate, which 
was the case before the crisis, and instead interest rates will 
either fluctuate with large volatility between the bottom 
and the top of the corridor, or they will stick to the bottom 
of the corridor permanently.
CONCLUSIONS: INTRODUCTION OF THE 
OPTIONAL RESERVE RATIOS COULD 
ENHANCE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE 
RESERVE REQUIREMENT SYSTEM
The temporary forint liquidity shortage situation – giving 
rise to the reduction of the reserve ratio in November 2008 
– which appeared at certain banks as a result of the crisis, 
and the considerable shrinkage of the interbank markets' 
liquidity ceased starting from the end of 2008 and due to 
the generally ample forint liquidity surplus both at the 
systemic and the individual bank level no similar situation is 
expected to arise in the medium term. As a result of this, in 
order to mitigate the liquidity management frictions 
generated by the low reserve ratio – as described in the 
previous chapter – the idea of reinstating the ratio to its 
previous 5% level could have come up as an evident solution. 
This would have significantly assisted the liquidity 
management of domestic banks with relatively large payment 
turnover, while – in terms of liquidity management – it 
would have had neutral effect on banks with relatively high 
balance sheet total.
The argument against a uniform increase in the reserve 
ratio to 5% is that according to the experiences of the 
period starting from November 2008, the 2% reserve ratio 
provided many banks with an adequate scope for efficient 
liquidity management. In the longer run it cannot be 
completely ruled out that lasting, single-direction liquidity 
Chart 5
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absorbing shocks – similar to those at the end of 2008 – may 
arise in the domestic banking system or at certain credit 
institutions, giving rise to a sudden and significant increase 
in forint liquidity demands. In such cases, it is advantageous 
if no high forint liquidity is tied up unnecessarily in required 
reserves in the case of banks that otherwise can adequately 
manage the shocks occurring in their payment turnover 
even with a lower reserve ratio.
It is also worth considering that following the introduction 
of euro in Hungary, the domestic banks will also be subject 
to ECB's minimum reserve requirements, i.e. if we do not 
expect changes in ECB’s requirements, they will be subject 
to a 2% reserve ratio. Although the exact date of introducing 
euro in Hungary is uncertain, and until then the MNB 
wishes to apply a reserve regulation that takes account of 
the Hungarian specialities, it makes no sense to oblige those 
banks for which the 2% value is optimal already at present 
to return to the higher reserve ratio.
As we saw it, all in all it was not the specific rate of the 
reserve ratio either before or after November 2008 that 
hindered the reserve requirement system in providing even 
more efficient support to banks' liquidity management and 
thereby facilitating even more the narrowing of the gap 
between the interbank rates and the central bank base rate. 
The main hindering factor was that the uniform reserve 
ratio applicable to all banks makes the reserve requirement 
system too inflexible. Prior to November 2008 the required 
reserve amount was already too high – in terms of liquidity 
management – for some banks, while thereafter it was too 
low for some other banks. It should be emphasised that we 
cannot differentiate banks in terms of quality based on 
whether the lower or the higher reserve ratio is more 
favourable for them in terms of liquidity management, as 
this is influenced by many unique, equally acceptable 
business policy and other decisions, as well as circumstances 
that appear for the bank as a condition, which – moreover 
– with time may also change in the case of a specific bank.
Nevertheless, the lesson learnt from the period since 
November 2008 is that with a uniform reserve ratio the 
reserve requirement system is less capable of accomplishing 
its original objective, i.e. to support the liquidity management 
of domestic credit institutions and narrow the gap between 
the interbank rates and the central bank base rate, than if 
each bank's required reserve amount can approximate the 
value which is individually optimal for the bank in question.
T h i s  l a t t e r  c a n  b e  a c h i e v e d  m o s t  e a s i l y  i f  –  u n d e r  a n  
unchanged reserve base and subject to certain predefined 
limits – each bank applies a reserve ratio that corresponds 
to its own balance sheet total and payment turnover 
features. Accordingly, as of the reserve maintenance period 
c o m m e n c i n g  i n  N o v e m b e r  2 0 1 0  e a c h  H u n g a r i a n  c r e d i t  
institution may decide on its own whether it applies the 2% 
ratio applicable before or to a higher one. Credit institutions 
may select from reserve ratios of 2, 3, 4 and 5%, and they 
may change their choice semi-annually.
With the introduction of the optional higher reserve ratio, 
the MNB wishes to remedy the asymmetry that has existed 
so far in the reserve requirement system as a result of the 
uniform reserve ratio. This could ensure that in the future 
the reserve requirement system supports the liquidity 
m a n a g e m e n t  o f  a l l  d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w i t h  
appropriate efficiency and thereby contributes to the largest 
possible extent to narrowing the gap between the interbank 
rates and the central bank base rate. It is worth considering 
choosing a reserve ratio higher than the present 2% for 
those banks that for the optimal management of the 
liquidity shocks affecting them may need the wider scope of 
central bank account balance fluctuation provided by the 
higher reserve requirement.
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